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Abstract 
Mobile malware has increased rapidly last 10 years. This rapid 
increase is due to the rapid enhancement of mobile technology 
and their power to do most work for their users. Since mobile 
devices are personal devices, then a special action must be taken 
towards preserving privacy and security of the mobile data. 
Malware refers to all types of software applications with 
malicious behavior. In this paper, we propose a malware 
detection technique called Personal Mobile Malware Guard – 
PMMG-  that classifies malwares based on the mobile user 
feedback. PMMG controls permissions of different applications 
and their behavior according to the user needs. These 
preferences are built incrementally on a personal basis according 
to the feedback of the user. Performance analysis showed that it 
is theoretically feasible to build PMMG tool and use it on 
mobile devices. 
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1. Introduction 
According to Oxford dictionary, malware is defined as 
“Software which is specifically designed to disrupt, 
damage, or gain authorized access to a computer system. “. 
this category of software includes all types of software 
with malicious intent like Trojans, Viruses, Worms, … etc. 
The most common malware programs are viruses. A virus 
is a self-replicating code that can infect programs by 
modifying them or their environment, it is able to spread 
rapidly via email or network propagation. A worm is an 
independent program that copy itself and spreads over the 
network, the new copies are fully independent and can 
spread by their own [1].  
A Trojan is a software that appears to the user to be 
benign application however, it performs malicious acts in 
the background [6]. Trojan are used to help attacking a 
system by performing acts that might compromise 
security of the system and hence enables hacking it easily. 
Ransomware is another type of malware that prevents the 
users from accessing their data by locking the device or 
encrypting the data files, until ransom amount is paid [10]  
A famous malware is called a  "bot" which is a type of 
malware that enables an attacker to take control over an 
affected Mobile device, it is also known as “Web robots”, 
they are part of a network of infected machines, known as 
a “botnet”, which is typically made up of all victim 
mobile devices across the globe[11].  Spywares are 
simply spying software. They run unnoticed in the 
background while they collect information, or give remote 
access to their authors [12] ,[13] [16].  
The number of mobile malwares is increasing 
dramatically last two years. According to Macafe LABs 
[28], the number of malwares exceeded 16,000,000 in first 
quarter of 2017. By looking at the global mobile malware 
infection rate reported by Macafe LABs 2017, Figure 1 
shows a significant increase in the infection rate for the 
first quarter of the year 2017. 
 
Figure 1: global mobile malware infection rates 
Kaspersky Labs [32] reported the distribution of new 
mobile malware in the years 2015 and 2016 as shown in 
Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: distribution of mobile malware 
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These types of malware are harmful to systems and hence 
must be detected and removed to make sure that the 
system functions well. The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows: A literature review of current malware 
detection techniques is proposed. A description of how 
PMMG technique works is then provided. Analysis of the 
technique is carried out. And at last a summary is 
provided. 
2. Literature review  
To better detect malwares, we have to both understand 
their behavior and how do they spread, in this section, we 
provide a brief summary of how do malwares spread. We 
also provide the state-of-the-art mobile malware detection 
technique. 
2.1 Malware spreading techniques 
To mitigate malware attacks, we should be aware of 
malware spreading techniques. In this section, we 
categorize malware spreading techniques as follows: 
2.1.1 Repackaging  
Malware authors repackage popular mobile applications 
in official market, and distribute them on other less 
monitored third party markets. Repackaging includes the 
disassembling of the popular benign apps, and appending 
the malicious content and reassembling. This is done by 
reverse-engineering tools. TrendMicro report have shown 
that 77% of the top 50 free apps available in Google Play 
are repackaged [14].  
2.1.2 Drive By Download  
Drive by Download refers to an unintentional download 
of malware in the background. It Occurs when a user visit 
a website that contains malicious content and downloads 
malware into the device. Android/NotCompatible [15] is 
the most popular mobile malware of this category.  
2.1.3. Dynamic Payloads  
Uses dynamic payload to download an embedded 
encrypted source in an application. After installation, the 
app decrypts the encrypted malicious payload and 
executes the malicious code [16].   
2.1.4. Stealth Malware Techniques  
Stealth Malware Technique refers to an exploit of 
hardware vulnerabilities to obfuscate the malicious code 
to easily bypass the antimalware. Different stealth 
techniques such as key permutation, dynamic loading, 
native code execution, code encryption, and java 
reflection are used to attack the victim’s device [16]. 
2.2 Malware detection techniques: 
In this section, we analyze the state-of-the-art malware 
detection techniques for mobile devices. According to 
[30], mobile malware detection techniques are categorized 
into two categories according to the basis they rely on 
when detecting for malwares. The categories are statics 
techniques and dynamic techniques 
2.2.1 Static techniques: 
Static techniques rely on the source code of an application 
to classify it accordingly without having the application 
executed. These techniques are classified into one of the 
following classes according to the basis they rely on for 
analyzing the source code. Table 1 summarizes static 
techniques 
Table 1: summary of mobile malware static detection techniques 
Technique How does it work Advantages Disadvantages 
Signature Based 
Approach [18]. 
This method extracts the 
semantic patterns and creates a 
unique signature 
It is a very fast method for 
detecting malware 
IT can only identify the existing 
malwares and fails against the 
unseen variants of malwares 
Permission Based 
Analysis [19]. 
Analyzes permissions required 
by applications and detect 
abnormal requirements 
fast in application scanning 
and identifying malware 
Permission based methods 
require second pass to provide 
efficient malware detection. 
Virtual machine 
analysis [20]. 
tests the app behavior and 
analyses control and data flow 
which in sake of  detecting 
dangerous functionalities 
Tests the byte code of an 
application and track 
sensitive API calls 
Analysis is performed at 
instruction level and consumes 
more power and storage space. 
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Table 2: Dynamic mobile malware detection techniques 
Technique How does it work Advantages Disadvantages 
Anomaly based 
[21],[22],[23], 
[24] 
based on watching the behavior of the device 
by keeping track of different parameters and 
the status of the components of the device 
It engages different 
parameters and hence have a 
clear image of the system 
The larger the parameters 
engaged the more the 
calculation required. 
Taint 
analysis[25] 
tracks multiple sources of sensitive data and 
identifies the data leakage in mobile apps 
efficient tracking of sensitive 
data 
does not perform control 
flow tracking. 
Emulation based 
[26] 
dynamically analyze apps based on Virtual 
Machine Introspection 
It monitors the whole system 
by being out of execution 
environment 
cannot detect new malwares 
 
 
2.2.2 Dynamic techniques: 
In dynamic analysis, an application is examined during 
execution and then classified according to one of the 
following techniques. The classification is done according 
to the behavior of the detection mechanism. Table 2 
summarizes these techniques. 
As shown in this Section, malware detection techniques 
have limitations and do not give very accurate detection. 
The idea is to engage the user’s preferences in malware 
detection by having their feedback from interactions they 
provide when using the malware detection tool. In the 
next section, we will provide details about our proposed 
Personal Mobile Malware Guard – PMMG. 
 
3. PMMG System 
Our proposed malware detection technique depends on 
user’s preferences for application permissions. The 
technique is called Personal Mobile Malware Guard, 
shortly PMMG. PMMG works in between the operating 
system and mobile applications. It interacts with the 
mobile user for granting permission to the application. In 
case the user denies the permission, PMMG refuses the 
permission, and incase a program will terminate if 
permission is denied, then PMMG provides a virtual 
resource to the application so that it will not have actual 
access to the resource and will continue working with that 
virtual resource. In this section, we will detail the 
components of PMMG and the work flow as well. 
As shown in Figure 3, PMMG consists of four modules 
that interact with the mobile user and application. These 
modules are PMMG interface, Permit Granter, Virtual 
profile, and Rule Base.  
 
Figure 3: components of PMMG system 
3.1 PMMG Components: 
The components of PMMG shown in Figure 3 will be 
described in this subsection, the workflow will be detailed 
in the later subsection. 
3.1.1 PMMG interface: 
The PMMG interface is the module that interacts with 
user and the mobile application. The role of this module is 
to provide an interface to both mobile application and 
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mobile user. The mobile application will have to ask 
PMMG interface for a permission. The mobile interface 
will interact with user and with the other components of 
PMMG system and respond to the application by granting 
access to the resource or blocking the access and pretend 
to make it available to the application by a virtual access 
profile (will be detailed later). 
3.1.2 Permit Granter: 
The permit granter is responsible for issuing the decision 
about the permission required according to user’s 
feedback and the rule database. It forms the gateway of 
the PMMG interface with both Virtual Profile and Rule 
database. The aim of this architecture is to hide the Rule 
database and Virtual profile from the PMMG interface 
and hence from the mobile application. The granter will 
check the rule database and respond to the PMMG 
interface by a suitable response accordingly. 
3.1.3 Rule Database 
The Rule Database contains the permission rules granted 
to applications. Each application requires a permission 
and granted that permission is stored in the database. 
Applications with denied permissions are also stored. The 
rule database returns the permission status of that 
application and responds to the PMMG interface. 
Permission state might be actual or virtual. Actual 
permissions are those real permissions granted to 
application while virtual permission are fake permission 
provided to application so that they can proceed working 
with the least required permission.  
3.1.4 Virtual profile 
The Virtual Profile module is responsible for running a 
virtual process simulating interface of the actual resource 
required. For example, if a program requires a permission 
to the microphone and the user denied that access, this 
module will run a process simulating the work of the 
microphone without having to run the actual microphone. 
For Virtual Profile to work, it requires building virtual 
profiles for each sensitive resource in the system 
including microphone and camera. When a user refuses a 
permission to the program and still need that program to 
work, then the virtual profiler will deceive the program by 
launching the virtual profile instead of actual profile. 
For a virtual profiler to work well, it has to support virtual 
drivers for sensitive hardware resources such as camera 
and mic. There are many mobile applications that support 
this and can easily be found at google play and app store. 
Besides, a virtual profiler has to feed fake data for 
sensitive components like contacts, logs, messages … etc. 
As for hardware, virtual drivers, there are many 
application for these sensitive applications on google play 
and app store. 
3.2 PMMG Work Flow 
Base on Figure 3, the work flow of PMMG consists of 
interactions among PMMG interface, the mobile user, and 
the mobile application. Before proceeding with the work 
flow, the assumptions of the underlying system must be 
first addressed. In this subsection, we will provide the 
assumption of the underlying mobile operating 
environment and then we will detail the work flow. 
3.2.1 Environment assumptions  
With PMMG, we assume that the underlying mobile 
operating system delegates the management of 
permissions to PMMG by allowing it to grant access, 
deny access, or grant access virtually. Grant access gives 
the application full access to the required resource, while 
deny access prohibit access to the resource. Grant access 
virtually denies actual access to the resources and initiates 
a virtual resource to deceive the application of granting it 
full access. 
3.2.2 Work flow 
To have PMMG working properly, it has to be set up and 
initialized properly. Therefore, there are two phases for 
PMMG to work, set up phase and running phase. In this 
subsection, we will detail both phases. 
3.2.2.1 Setup phase 
In the setup phase, PMMG will be granted full access to 
the permission file of the mobile operating system. 
PMMG should build virtual profiles for all sensitive 
mobile resources. These virtual profiles are built upon the 
underlying operating system and must have the same 
interface of the resource required. The application will 
interact with the virtual profile as if it is interacting with 
the actual resource and the virtual profile should respond 
with virtual response similar to the actual profile response. 
For example, if the resource is the camera, the virtual 
profile should have the same interface of the camera and 
respond with similar, but fake, images to the application. 
Since the camera is denied by user, then the application 
will continue working with using virtual camera instead of 
actual one, hence user’s privacy will be maintained. This 
is applied to all other resources like microphone, contacts, 
messages, Wi-Fi … etc. 
3.2.2.2 Running Phase 
During running phase, PMMG is expected to guard the 
mobile resources according to user’s preferences. The 
running phase is described below: 
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1) When a mobile application is newly installed, all 
required permission are transferred to PMMG 
interface which in turns invoke the user for the 
permissions. 
2) According to the user’s responses, permissions 
are either: 
a. Granted  
b. Denied 
c. Granted virtually – when the program 
does not work without a permission to 
this resource. 
3) The user’s preferences rules are then transferred 
to Permit Granter who in turns stores these rules 
in Rule Database. 
4) When a mobile application is opened, the 
permissions are transferred to PMMG interface 
for decisions.  
5) PMMG interface then asks Permit Granter to 
check Rule Database for those permissions. 
a. If permission status is grant, then 
PMMG interface will grant that 
permission to application.  
b. If permission status is denying, then 
PMMG interface will deny that 
permission to application. 
c. If permission status is grant virtually, 
then PMMG interface will ask Virtual 
Profiler for a virtual grant interface. 
6) If permission status is not available in Rule 
Database, then PMMG interface will ask the user 
for the status of that permission. And the steps 2 
and 3 are performed. 
7) PMMG interface enables users to modify the 
rules according to their preferences, once 
modified, these rules will be applied. 
Setup phase and running phase form the basis of our 
PMMG algorithm. In the next section, we will analyze the 
performance of PMMG according to these two stages. 
4. Performance analysis  
To analyze the performance of PMMG, we should take 
into account the cost of setup phase and running phase. 
The setup phase is performed one time when PMMG is 
installed, and hence the cost of this phase is constant. The 
important analysis is the runtime analysis i.e. performance 
of PMMG during running.  
According to [28], the average number of mobile 
applications used by users in 9 daily and 30 monthly. This 
means that average users will have less than one new 
application per day. Based on these statistics, and taking 
into consideration the status of an application, we can 
calculate the performance of PMMG according to Table 3. 
 
Table 3: calculating performance of PMMG 
status Required steps 
Newly installed program 
User interaction (UI) 
Permit Granter (PG) 
Database access (DBA) 
Virtual Profile (optional) (VP) 
Previously installed program 
Permit Granter (PG) 
Database access (DBA) 
Virtual Profile (optional) (VP) 
 
According to Table 1, the following formulas calculate the 
performance for the newly installed program and the 
previously installed ones.  
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑝𝑝 = 𝑈𝐼 + 𝑃𝐺 + 𝐷𝐵𝐴 + 𝑉𝑃 … 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1 
𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝐺 + 𝐷𝐵𝐴 + 𝑉𝑃 … 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2 
The time required for performing UI, PG and DBA is 
constant and mainly depends on the mobile device 
specifications. However, the time required for VP varies 
according to the type of the permission required and the 
time VP will run. VP will launch a virtual profile that will 
run instead of the actual resource the whole period 
required by the application program to run that resource. 
Besides, t VP will run different profiles according to the 
required resource, hence, different profiles require 
different running times. 
Generally, as the number of applications increases, then 
the total required time for PMMG increases. Assuming 
that the number of application for a particular mobile user 
is n, then we have: 
𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 = 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑝𝑝 + 𝑛 ∗ 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑝  …   𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 3 
Since we have 9 applications per user daily, and we have 
less than one new application daily, then the daily 
performance will be: 
𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 = 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑝𝑝 + 9 ∗ 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑝 
According to [29], the average user spends about 3 hours 
on mobile device daily, and knowing that 9 applications 
are used daily, then, each application on average is run 
about 20 minutes which we will call appTime. Assuming 
that half of the applications will require VP to run, then 
VP time can be calculated as follows: 
𝑉𝑃 =
𝑛
2
∗ 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 … 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 4 
According to equation 3 and equation 4, we have: 
𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 = 𝑈𝐼 + 𝑃𝐺 + 𝐷𝐵𝐴 + 𝑉𝑃 + (𝑛) ∗ (𝑃𝐺
+ 𝐷𝐵𝐴 + 𝑉𝑃) …   𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 5 
Simplifying equation 5 results in: 
𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 = 𝑈𝐼 + (𝑛 + 1) ∗ (𝑃𝐺 + 𝐷𝐵𝐴 + 𝑉𝑃)  
And substituting VP will result in: 
𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 = 𝑈𝐼 + (𝑛 + 1) ∗ (𝑃𝐺 + 𝐷𝐵𝐴 +
𝑛
2
∗ 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒) …   𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 6 
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According to equation 6, the running time of PMMG is 
quadratic with respect to the number of running 
applications n, however, n is small (on average 9 for the 
year 2017) and hence the time will not grow large.  This 
makes our PMMG theoretically feasible in terms of 
performance and this small lack of performance is 
justified for the sake of better and controlled privacy.  
5. Summary 
In this paper, we proposed a novel mobile malware 
detection technique called PMMG. PMMG relies on 
user’s preferences to manage mobile application 
permission in a way to better enhance mobile user’s 
privacy. These preferences are built incrementally on a 
personal basis according to the feedback of the user. 
Detailed description of the components and workflow of 
PMMG technique besides performance analysis showed 
that applying this technique to detects and block malware 
access to sensitive mobile resources is feasible, but 
slightly reduces performance. This small reduction in 
performance is really justified to increase the privacy and 
security level of the mobile device and provide a better 
privacy management to the user. As a future work, a tool 
based on PMMG will be built and tested. Practical 
performance results and any other modifications will be 
proposed in a future work. 
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